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STARE DECISIS IN CONSTITUTIONAL
CASES: RECONSIDERING NATIONAL
LEAGUE OF CITIES
Philip P. Frickey*
Institutional dialogues contribute at least as much to constitutional law as their more celebrated colleague, logic. Principles of
judicial restraint sometimes lead courts to initiate a dialogue with
the legislature designed to alter public policy through institutional
cooperation rather than judicial fiat. I Principles of stare decisis
promote a different, internalized dialogue. This dialogue is twosided, at least figuratively, when judges in effect engage in an imaginary argument about the validity of a precedent with their
predecessors. When the precedent in question is recent, however,
the dialogue of stare decisis can become a soliliquy by judges who
may wish to overrule their own previous decision.
Considerations of stare decisis differ depending upon whether
this dialogue is historical or soliliqual-that is, depending upon
whether the precedent in question was born of a different court
from that considering overruling it. These differences are highlighted by the Supreme Court's current deliberation into whether
to overrule a rather recent and highly questionable decision.
On the last day of the 1983 Term, the Court ordered reargument in two cases raising the issue whether the Fair Labor Standards Act2 (FLSA) may constitutionally apply to San Antonio's
municipal transportation employees in light of National League of
Cities v. Usery. 3 The Court sua sponte requested the parties to discuss "[w]hether or not the principles of the Tenth Amendment as
set forth in [National League of Cittes] should be reconsidered."4
In answering this question, the Court must consider the role of
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. The author
thanks Mary Ann Bernard, Dan Farber, John Matheson, and Cass Sunstein for their helpful co=ents on an earlier draft of this essay.
I. Eg., Bickel, The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.
3. 426 u.s. 833 (1976).
4. 52 U.S.L.W. 3937 (1984). The pending cases are Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, No. 82-1913, and Donovan v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, No. 82-1951.
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stare decisis in constitutional litigation in general and in the context of National League of Cities in particular. Because National
League of Cities is a rather recent precedent and could be overruled by the change of only one vote, overruling it seemingly
would involve gross disrespect for stare dec1siJ'-indeed, might reveal the Court to be the unprincipled, political entity envisioned
by some critics. The burden of this essay is to demonstrate the
contrary. Overruling National League of Cities would be principled and consistent with stare dec1s1s. This is so in part because
the dialogue of stare decisis involved in this situation is soliliqual
rather than historical.
I

In 1974 Congress extended the minimum-wage and overtimepay protections of the FLSA to most employees of state or local
governments. 5 This enactment surely must have seemed beyond
constitutional objection. Since 1937,6 the Court had consistently
upheld federal legislation regulating the most local affairs of the
private sector. The Court had subordinated concerns about federal intrusion into the affairs of state or local governments,
stressed the "plenary" nature of congressional power under the
commerce clause, and called the tenth amendment a mere "truism" devoid of any protection of state sovereignty.? The Court
had expressly approved federal regulation affecting state employees in 1936 in United States v. Cal!fornia,s when it sustained a fed5. Pub. L. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55. The act provided exemptions from coverage for executive, administrative, or professional employees and for elected public officials and their
aides. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 838-39.
6. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I (1937), held that the National
Labor Relations Act was within Congress's authority under the commerce clause, and
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), upheld the constitutionality of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.
7. In Darby, supra, 312 U.S. at 123-24, the Court stated:
Our conclusion is unaffected by the Tenth Amendment which provides:
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest that it was more
than declaratory of the relationship between the national and state governments
as it had been established by the Constitution before the amendment or that its
purpose was other than to allay fears that the new national government might
seek to exercise powers not granted, and that the states might not be able to exercise fully their reserved powers.
8. 297 U.S. 175 (1936). In response to California's argument that "it is engaged in
performing a public function in its sovereign capacity and for that reason cannot ~nstitu
tionally be subjected to the provisions of the federal act," id at 183, the Court unarumously
stated (id at 184-85):
The sovereign power of the states is necessarily diminished to the extent of the
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eral safety statute that applied to a state-operated railroad.
Indeed, as recently as 1968, the Court in Maryland v. Wirtz9 had
upheld an earlier amendment extending the FLSA to employees
of state hospitals, institutions, and schools. Justice Harlan, a firm
believer in federalism, wrote for the Court in Wirtz:
[W)hile the commerce power has limits, valid general regulations of commerce do
not cease to be regulations of commerce because a State is involved. If a State is
engaging in economic activities that are validly regulated by the Federal Government when engaged in by private persons, the State too may be forced to conform
its activities to federal regulation.IO

Yet the seeds for the invalidation of the 1974 extension of the
FLSA had been planted even prior to enactment of those amendments. By 1974, only five members of the Wirtz Court remained,
and two of them-Douglas and Stewart-had dissented. In this
new environment the validity of the 1974 amendments promptly
came into question. In 1975 the Court agreed to hear National
League of Citiestt rather than simply affirming the lower court,
which had upheld the amendments on the authority of Maryland
v. Wirtz. Later in the same Term, in Fry v. United States,t2 the
Court upheld the application of federal emergency wage controls
to state and local employees, while simultaneously slipping away
from the broad language of Wirtz. The majority opinion in Fry
contained a footnote apparently recognizing that the tenth amendment afforded some constitutional protection of state sovereignty.tJ Even so, Justice Rehnquist lodged a powerful dissent
grants of power to the federal government in the Constitution. . . . [We]look to
the activities in which the states have traditionally engaged as marking the
boundary of the restriction upon the federal taxing power. But there is no such
limitation upon the plenary power to regulate commerce. The state can no more
deny the power if its exercise has been authorized by Congress than can an
individual.
9. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
10. Jd at 196-97.
II. 420 U.S. 906 (1975), noting probable jurisdiction of National League of Cities v.
Brennan, 406 F. Supp. 826 (D.D.C. 1974) (three-judge court). The district court had stated
that in its view the contentions that the amendments impermissibly intruded upon state
sovereignty were "substantial and . . . it may well be that the Supreme Court will feel it
appropriate to draw back from the far-reaching implications of [Maryland v. Wirtz); but
that is a decision that only the Supreme Court can make . . . ." 406 F. Supp. at 828.
12. 421 u.s. 542 (1975).
13. The Court stated (id at 547 n.7):
While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a "truism," stating merely
that "all is retained which has not been surrendered," United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941), it is not without significance. The Amendment expressly declares
the constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that
impairs the S_tates' integrity or their ability _to function effectively in a federal
syste!D. Despite the extravagant claims on this score made by some amici, we are
convmced that the wage restriction regulations constituted no such drastic invasion of state sovereignty.
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urging the overruling of Maryland v. Wirtz. He contended that
wages paid to state employees engaged in "traditional state functions" are beyond Congress's commerce authority.J4
In National League of Cities, Rehnquist's Fry dissent became
the law. Justice Rehnquist's opinion for a five-judge majority,
while not questioning the plenary federal power to regulate the
private sector, overruled Maryland v. Wirtz and purported to
render the states immune from federal regulation that "directly
displace[s] the States' freedom to structure integral operations in
areas of traditional government functions."1s The critical fifth
vote came from Justice Blackmun, however, whose concurring
opinion substantially limited the sweep of Rehnquist's absolutist
language. Blackmun construed the majority opinion as adopting
a balancing approach, allowing federal regulation in "areas such
as environmental protection, where the federal interest is demonstrably greater and where state facility compliance with imposed
federal standards would be essential."J6 The four dissenters argued that the states have no immunity from federal regulation.
The vagueness of the standard announced by Justice Rehnquist, along with the uncertainty arising from Justice Blackmun's
attempt to tack a balancing test onto the analysis, have required
the Court to decide several more cases involving federal regulation of state operations. In each instance the Court has upheld the
federal regulation by distinguishing National League of Cities,
sometimes in dubious ways. These decisions suggest that National
League of Cities may have been a "sport" to which the Court will
not adhere strictly. Most recently, the Court's order in the San
Antonio cases suggests that at least five justices may now be interested in expressly overruling that precedent rather than continuing to narrow it.
The first step in the Court's analysis in the San Antonio cases
will have to be a critical assessment of National League of Cities
and the cases following it. The work of several commentators
should be helpful in this regard.n But the Court must also consider whether overruling National League of Cities would comport
with the Supreme Court's approach to stare decisis in constitu14. Id at 557-58 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
IS. 426 U.S. at 852. The Court's recognition of the scope of the federal co=erce
power over the private sector is found in id at 840-41.
16. Id at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
17. See, e.g., Alfange, Congressional Regulation of the "States Qua States':· F_rom ~a
tional League of Cities to EEOC v. Wyoming, 1983 SuP. CT. REV. 215, and matenals ctted
in id at 216 n.J4.
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tional cases. Below is an attempt to provide some guidance regarding this latter inquiry.
II

The legitimacy of judicial review in a democracy is, of course,
an issue at the heart of constitutional law. One traditional answer
has been that judicial review is tolerable only to the extent that the
Supreme Court operates as a disinterested decisionmaker, insulated as far as humanly possible from the personal predilictions of
the justices. An important factor tending to impersonalize, and
therefore legitimate, judicial review is stare decisis, as Justice Jackson recognized:
I cannot believe that any person who at all values the judicial process or distinguishes its method and philosophy from those of the political and legislative process would abandon or substantially impair the rule of stare decisis. Unless the
assumption is substantially true that cases will be disposed of by application of
known principles and previously disclosed courses of reasoning, our co=on-Iaw
process would become the most intolerable kind of ex post facto judicial lawmaking. Moderation in change is all that makes judicial participation in the evolution
of the law tolerable. Either judges must be fettered to mere application of a legislative code with a minimum of discretion, as in continental systems, or they must
formulate and adhere to some voluntary principles that will impart stability and
predictability to judicial discretion. IS

The Supreme Court has not, however, adhered rigidly to
stare decisis. It is well established that, both because constitutional law is thought to be a living instrument of public policy
adaptable to changing circumstances and because no practical
method other than judicial overruling exists to modify erroneous
or obsolete constitutional decisions, stare decisis is not a strict
command in constitutional cases.t9 When this flexible precept is
18. Jackson, /Jecisionol Law and Stare /Jecisis, 30 A.B.A.J. 334, 334 (1944). Several
other useful discussions of stare decisis in constitutional law have also come from those
who have had a hand in applying that doctrine. SeeW. DoUGLAS, STARE DECISIS (1949);
A. GoLDBERG, EQUAL JusTICE 65-97 (1971); Reed, Stare /Jecisis and Constitutional Law,
35 PA. B.A.Q. 131 ( 1938) (written when he was Solicitor General); Stevens, The Life Span
of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. I (1983). The Douglas, Goldberg, and Reed
writings are interesting "period pieces" reflecting the impetus to change constitutional law
in the eras of the Warren Court and the Second New Deal. The Jackson remarks represent
a more restrained attempt to assess why stare decisis appeared to be waning. The Stevens
lecture is a good, short, contemporary overview of stare decisis. For other recent co=entaries, see Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 811-32 (1982);
Maltz, Some Thoughts on the /Jeath of Stare /Jecisis in Constitutional Law, 1980 Wts. L.
REV. 467.
19. Justice Brandeis penned what is probably the most frequently cited passage supporting this conclusion:
Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more
important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled
right. . . . This is co=only true even where the error is a matter of serious
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considered along with the limited force of the principle of stare
decisis in general,2o the Court's freedom to reconsider a constitutional precedent seems great indeed. In fact, the Court is well on
its way to issuing its two-hundredth opinion in which a precedent
is overruled. 21 To be sure, many of these opinions have provoked
little controversy, but every overruling opinion demonstrates the
subjective elements of judicial review to some extent. Obviously,
the problem of subjectivity is enhanced when a recent precedent is
overruled after a change in the Court's membership.
Skilled use of the judicial craft is the only method available
to mitigate the strain on the Court's impersonal institutional image caused by overruling. There is an "art of overruling" consisting of the use of techniques "in overruling opinions that, as a
general pattern, tend to preserve the impersonal qualities of the
judicial process by emphasizing factors other than the vicissitudes
of changing personnet."22 These techniques include reliance upon
changed conditions that have undermined the basis for the overruled decision, reliance upon the difficulties the Court has experienced in attempting to apply the overruled decision, and reliance
upon the inconsistency between that decision and subsequent precedent.23 These techniques are easy to apply to National League
concern, provided correction can be had by legislation. But in cases involving the
Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action is practically
impossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier decisions.
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393,406-07 (1932) (dissenting opinion). Early
recognition of the llexibility of the principle of stare decisis in constitutional cases can be
found in The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 456 (185 I), and The Passenger Cases,
48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 470 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
20. Justice Frankfurter for the Court in Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119
( 1940), in the course of overruling a recent decision on an issue of statutory construction,
stated:
We recognize that stare decisis embodies an important social policy. It represents an element of continuity in law, and is rooted in the psychologic need to
satisfy reasonable expectations. But stare decisis is a principle of policy and not a
mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision, however recent and questionable, when such adherence involves collision with a prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by experience.
21. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 1789-97
(1973), and id at S332-33 (1980 Supp.), which presents a list of cases in which the Supreme
Court has overruled precedent. According to this source the Court has issued 171 overruling opinions through the 1980 Term.
22. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling, 1963 SuP. CT. REv. 211,
219.
23. /d at 219-29. Israel cited only six cases in which the overruled case was rejected
simply because it was thought to be wrong. ld at 223 n.60. In addition to National League
of Cities, cases decided after Israel's study that seem to fall into this category include Oregon ex rei. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977);
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971); Carafas v.
LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Harris v.
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of Cities. The case was both wrong and precedentially weak from
the start, has been stretched to the breaking point in later decisions, and can be overruled without creating undue hardship on
innocent parties.
A

National League of Cities has little claim to the protection of
stare decisis, having itself given little respect to precedent. The
bulk of Justice Rehnquist's opinion ignored Maryland v. Wirtz
and discerned theretofore unknown principles of state sovereignty
lurking in the federal system. Almost as an aside, near the end of
the opinion, Justice Rehnquist stated that "in view of the conclusions expressed earlier in this opinion we do not believe the reasoning of Wirtz may any longer be regarded as authoritative."24
Similarly, National LeagueofCitiesdenounced as "simply wrong"
the language in United States v. California that had led to the result in Wirtz. Rehnquist essentially limited California to its facts
by reinterpreting it as standing for the proposition that the state's
operation of a railroad in interstate commerce is not an integral
state activity.2s Neither the words stare decisis nor their import
was as much as mentioned in National League of Cities.
If the Court in the pending San Antonio cases gives National
League of Cities the same respect that National League of Cities
itself accorded to Maryland v. Wirtz and United States v. California, then National League of Cities will die a quick and certain
death. For apart from stare decisis, the case has little claim to
survival. As has been explored in detail elsewhere, Justice Stevens
is correct in labeling National League of Cities a "pure judicial
fiat."26 The commerce clause grants Congress unqualified power
over interstate commerce, and nowhere in the text of the Constitution can an exemption for states or cities be found. As Justice
Stevens has explained,
[t]he question ... is purely one of constitutional power. In exercising its
power to regulate the national market for the services of individuais---<:ither by
prescribing the minimum price for such services or by prohibiting employment
discrimination on account of age-may Congress regulate both the public sector
and the private sector of that market, or must it confine its regulation to the priUnited States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965). All of these cases overruled precedent less than ten
years old.
24. 426 U.S. at 854.
25. Jd at 854-55 and n.l8. See supra note 8.
26. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1067 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring). The
recent article of Alfange, supra note 17, presents a thorough critique of National League of
Cities. In addition, see materials cited by Alfange, at 216 n.l4.
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vate sector? If the power is to be adequate to enable the national government to
perform its central mission, that question can have only one answer.27

Whether the Constitution was designed for the central purpose of
ensuring plenary federal power to regulate commerce, as Justice
Stevens maintains, or whether that was simply one of several major purposes, he seems surely correct in concluding that the Constitution grants Congress plenary authority to regulate all forms of
employment in today's integrated economy and that it contains no
specified limitations on the exercise of that power.
If there were some practical justification for National League
of Cities, an argument might be available that it should survive
despite its baseless beginning,2s but no such justification is apparent. The states are well protected in Congress by the more or less
direct representation provided them by their senators and representatives. At least with respect to general regulation of employers such as that of the FLSA, they also benefit from virtual
representation "by senators and representatives responsive to the
wishes of the myriad other enterprises . . . covered."29 The states
survived intact in the years before Justice Rehnquist conferred
this novel immunity on them, and they are not likely to wither
away if that immunity is abolished. In short, National League of
Cities receives no support from present social needs.Jo
27. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1068 (Stevens, J., concurring).
28. Cf Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 189-92 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(though Jones v. A !fred H. Mayer Co. wrongly interpreted Congress's intent in enacting the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, it should not be overruled because its interpretation "surely accords with the prevailing sense of justice today" and because overruling it "would be a
significant step backwards, with effects that would not have arisen from a correct decision
in the first instance"). See also Florida Dept. of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Florida Nursing Home Assoc., 450 U.S. 147, 151-55 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice
Stevens's interest in stare decisis is also exemplified by Stevens, supra note 18.
29. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 224 n.44 (1980). See J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL
REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 171-259 (1980); La Pierre, The Political
Safeguards of Federalism Redux: Intergovernmental Immunity and the States as Agents af
the Nation, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 779, 977-1056 (1982); Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 CoLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). Justice Brennan's dissent in National League of Cities
made a similar argument. 426 U.S. at 876-77.
30. See generally Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1033,
1072 (1981) ("[H]owever useful an understanding of the past may be in clarifying . . .
choices [in constitutional decisionmaking], it cannot determine our response to them. That
prerogative-and burden-belongs to the present.") Cf Jones, An Invitation to Jurisprudence, 74 CoLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1025 (1974) ("the durability of a legal principle, its reliability as a source of guidance for the future, is determined far more by the principle's social
utility, or lack of it, than by its verbal elegance or formal consistency with other legal
precepts").
.
Engdahl, Sense and Nonsense About State Immunity, 2 CONST. CoMM. 93 (1985), With
whom I share the pages of this issue, presents an interesting effort to carve out a measure of
state immunity that is more persuasive than Justice Rehnquist's effort in National League
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Even apart from its weak reasoning and its disrespect of precedent, the precedential force of National League of Cities was
weak from the outset. It was born of a deeply divided Court and
announces no clear standards.3I Overruling opinions often recognize this vulnerability in cases being overruled.32 Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the five-member majority, which eschewed
reliance upon the tenth amendment or any other specific constitutional provision in favor of general principles of federalism, 33
used conclusory labels to demark the limits of state immunity.
The resulting confusion is well reflected in the opinion of the district court in the San Antonio cases:
The distinguishing characteristic entitling a state function to Tenth Amendment
protection from federal regulations has been described variously as "integral",
"essential", "basic", and "traditional". Despite the abundance of adjectives,
identifying which particular state functions are immune remains difficult.34

Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion undercut the majority's absolutist language by interpreting it as embodying a balancing approach, the quintessential form of jurisprudential
uncertainty.Js The confusion is only compounded if the balancing
approach is taken seriously. The FLSA amendments at issue in
National League of Cities did not require the states to abandon
of Cities, but nonetheless seems to me both to lack textual support in the Constitution and
to be unnecessary.
31. As Justice Jackson once explained:
The first essential of a lasting precedent is that the court or the rnajority that
promulgates it be fully committed to its principle. That means such individual
study of its background and antecedents, its draftsmanship and effects that at least
when it is announced it represents not a mere acquiescence but a conviction of
those who support it. When that thoroughness and conviction are lacking, a new
case, presenting a different aspect or throwing new light, results in overruling or
in some other escape from it that is equally unsettling to the law.
Jackson, supra note 18, at 335.
32. Israel, supra note 22, at 226.
33. See 426 U.S. at 852. Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Fry recognized that the tenth
amendment does not "by its terms" constrain the federal commerce power. 421 U.S. at
557. And yet the decisions following National LeagueofCilies have all referred to the tenth
amendment as its source of authority. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1060
(1983); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 758-71 (1982); United Transportation Union v.
Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678, 684 (1982); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 (1981). Moreover, in posing the question for reargument
in the San Antonio cases the Court spoke of"the principles of the Tenth Amendment as set
forth in [National League of CilieJj". See text at note 4 supra.
34. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. 445, 447
(W.D. Tex. 1983). See also Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Conslilulionalism, 42 OHIO
ST. L.J. 4ll, 420 (1981).
35. See general/yT. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 53-56 (1966); Tushnet, supra note 34, at 425; Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An lnlerpretalion of Public Law Scholarship in lite Seventies, 57 TEX. L. REv.
1307 ( 1979).
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any policy, but rather simply regulated the means of achieving
those ends. It is difficult to understand why the amendments
should not have been upheld under a balancing test concerned
with protecting only essential state policymaking sovereignty.36
At the very most, a remand might have been in order to allow the
district court to consider evidence of the effect of the FLSA upon
the operations of state and local governments.

B
These ambiguities and weaknesses of National League of Cities have been magnified in the Court's subsequent efforts to apply
the case. The "lessons of experience" and the "requirements of
later precedent" are both factors that influence overruling,J7 and
they coalesce in the cases subsequent to National Leagu'! of Cities
in a way that compels overruling. Even though National League
of Cities is only eight years old, the Court's experience with it as a
precedent has been demonstrably unsatisfactory.Js
A unanimous Court in Hodel v. Virginia Suiface Mining &
Reclamation Association concluded that the majority opinion in
National League of Cities embodied a three-part test for judging
whether a state was immune from regulatory legislation adopted
under the federal commerce clause:
First, there must be a showing that the challenged statute regulates the "States as
States." Second, the federal regulation must address matters that are indisputably
"attribute[s) of state sovereignty." And third, it must be apparent that the States'
compliance with the federal law would directly impair their ability "to structure
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions."39

Then, in homage to Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in National League of Cities, the Court in Hodel added a major
qualification:
Demonstrating that these three requirements are met does not, however, guarantee that a Tenth Amendment challenge to congressional commerce power action
will succeed. There are situations in which the nature of the federal interest ad36. The argument of the federal government in National League of Cities stressed
that, since the federal commerce power had been upheld even where it had displaced the
ultimate ends of state policy, see supra note 6, that power surely reached regulation of a
means by which state ends could be achieved. See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at
844-45; Brief for Appellee at 39-40, and Supplemental Brief for Appellee on Reargument at
2-6, National League of Cities, Transcript of Reargument at 38-41, National League of Cities
(remarks of Solicitor General Bork).
37. Israel, supra note 22, at 221-26.
38. See Alfange, supra note 17, at 247-81.
39. 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 (1981) (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 854,
845, 852).
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vanced may be such that it justifies state submission.40

Hodel's adoption of a balancing test makes plain that Justice
Rehnquist's opinion in National League of Cities is a "majority"
one in name only. Of course, it stands to reason that the inquiry
in subsequent cases would be governed by Justice Blackmun's balancing test, since the other eight justices are in two diametrically
opposed camps of four each, and each camp prefers a balancing
approach to the method favored by the other. The important
point for purposes of stare decisis is that in Hodel a unanimous
Court as much as admitted that Justice Rehnquist's opinion in
National League of Cities has only the precedential force of a plurality opinion.
To be sure, Hodel and the cases following it have not explicitly recognized the diminished stature of Justice Rehnquist's opinion in National League of Cities. Indeed, in each case the Court
has purported to rely upon the three-pronged test of Hodel that
supposedly is a mere summation of the Rehnquist approach.
Moreover, Hodel itself seems compatible with that approach.4I
But the applications of the three-pronged test in two more recent
cases are at odds with Justice Rehnquist's opinion in National
League of Cities and appear to rest solely on balancing.
The first was United Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail
Road Co.42 The Court in that case unanimously upheld the application of the Railway Labor Act, which regulates collective bargaining in the railroad industry, to a state-owned passenger
railroad. The Court concluded that the third prong of the Hodel
test was not satisfied. It first relied upon the reinterpretation of
United States v. California in National League of Cities as holding
simply that operating a railroad in interstate commerce was not an
integral state function.43 Second, the Court stressed that, although
"some passenger railroads have come under state control in recent
years, . . . that does not alter the historical reality that the opera40. Id at 288 n.29 (citing Blackmun, J., concurring in Nalional League o.f Cilies).
41. In Hodel the Court upheld the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977 on the ground that the statute, rather than regulating the "States as States," imposed
requirements upon private mining enterprises. This result is compatible with the distinction drawn in Justice Rehnquist's opinion in National League of Cilies between the FLSA's
impermissible regulation of the wages of state employees and the permissible displacement
of state policies concerning private enterprise present in the statutes upheld in prior cases.
See text at note 15 supra. Essentially the same can be said of FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S.
742 (1982), a 5-4 decision that rejected the argument that the Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act of 1978 violated the principles of Justice Rehnquist's opinion in National
League of Cilies.
42. 455 u.s. 678 (1982).
43. See text at note 25 supra.
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tion of railroads is not among the functions traditionally performed by state and local governments."44 The Court seemed to
be saying that only state activities with deep historical roots qualified for immunity from the federal commerce power. If the notion
of state sovereignty found in National League of Cities is taken
seriously, however, there is no logical or practical reason why innovative state responses to new problems should be unprotected
simply because they lack historical precedent.
The Court in Long Island Rail Road tacitly acknowledged the
tenuousness of its rationale. It asserted:
[W]e are not merely following dicta of [National League of Cilies) or looking only
to the past to determine what is "traditional." ... This Court's emphasis (in National League of Cities) on traditional governmental functions and traditional aspects of state sovereignty was not meant to impose a static historical view of state
functions generally immune from federal regulation. Rather it was meant to require an inquiry into whether the federal regulation affects basic State prerogatives in such a way as would be likely to hamper the state government's ability to
fulfill its role in the Union and endanger its "separate and independent
existence."45

Thus, the third prong of the Rode/test-whether state compliance
would directly impair its ability "to structure integral operations
in areas of traditional governmental functions" -appears to have
been rewritten to apply only to functions deemed essential to state
sovereignty. But which of the myriad operations of state and local
governments are at the core of "sovereignty" and which are mere
surplusage amenable to federal regulation? A state-operated railroad may sound less "essential" than police or fire protection, but
the commuters on the Long Island Railroad might well disagree,
especially considering that New York State took over the railroad
only to ensure continued service after the private sector had been
unable to operate it profitably.
The Court in Long Island Rail Road not only provided no
guidance out of this morass, it created even more confusion (if
that is possible). Following the language quoted above, the Court
added that "[j]ust as the Federal Government cannot usurp traditional state functions, there is no justification for a rule which
would allow the states, by acquiring functions previously performed by the private sector, to erode federal authority in areas
traditionally subject to federal statutory regulation." 46 The
Court's immediate point was only that the railroad industry has
long been comprehensively regulated by the federal government.
44. 455 U.S. at 686 (emphasis in original).
45. Id at 686-87 (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 851).
46. Id at 687.
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But the quoted language becomes paradoxical when it is recalled
that National League of Cities acknowledged plenary federal commerce power to regulate essentially all of the private sector. The
quoted language suggests that long-standing exercises of the federal commerce power to regulate activities in the private sector
render those activities amenable to continued federal regulation
even if they are later assumed by the states. By implication, private activities that Congress has failed to subject to federal regulation-whether due to benign neglect or to inattention-may
qualify for National League of Cities immunity if eventually undertaken by the states. This "use it or lose it"47 approach to the
federal commerce power is not only nonsensical, but perverse in
light of the obvious need for innovative federal regulation of the
national economy as the future unfolds. In seemingly replacing a
focus on "traditional state functions" with one centered on "traditional federal regulation," this approach appears to turn National
League of Cities on its head.
The confusion in Long Island Rail Road may have resulted in
part from a tacit application of a balancing approach. Although
the Court in Long Island Rail Road purported to apply only the
third prong of the Hodel test, it stressed the federal government's
determination that uniform national regulation was necessary to
the operation of the nation's railroad system.4s But how courts
can balance this federal interest against New York's interest in
providing commuter rail service is not clear-both are obviously
legitimate concerns of the respective sovereigns. Resolution of the
issue by the superior sovereign in a democratic fashion in which
the affected inferior sovereigns are well represented-i.e., by Congress-seems obviously superior to judicial balancing.
At bottom, Long Island Rail Road exemplifies the tension between two competing approaches to National League of Cities.
One, a historical test, could be applied by courts in a principled
manner, but only if it were limited to a "static historical view"
that was purportedly rejected in Long Island Rail Road and that
would seem to give short shrift to modern state innovations.
Moreover, under this frozen historical approach it would not be
clear that presumably prototypic traditional state functions would
be immune-after all, education became a universal state concern
only relatively recently in American history. Judicial balancing of
47. This catchy phrase was coined by Assistant Attorney General Theodore B. Olson
during his oral argument in the San Antonio cases. See Transcript of Argument at 16,
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, No. 82-1913 (Mar. 19, 1984).
48. See 455 U.S. at 687-90.
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the federal and state interests, the second approach lurking in
Long Island Rm1 Road, is exceedingly vulnerable to unprincipled
judicial decision making. All of this suggests that, even if state
immunity from federal regulation had a plausible basis in the
Constitution, the immense difficulty in crafting a manageable judicial standard for defining that immunity should lead the Court
to reject it altogether.49
The second case purporting to apply the three-pronged Hodel
test was EEOC v. Wyoming.so In a perhaps portentous decision,
Justice Blackmun joined the four justices who dissented in National League of Cities to uphold the application to the states of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Justice Brennan, who scathingly dissented in National League of Cities, wrote
the opinion for the Court in Wyoming. That opinion did not by its
terms challenge the precedential vitality of National League of Cities, but its reasoning is difficult to reconcile with the prior case.
A Wyoming statute required that state game and fish wardens could continue to work after the age of 55 only with state
approval and then only on a year-by-year basis. Under the
ADEA, workers between the ages of 40 and 70 are protected
against such discrimination on the basis of age unless "age is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of the particular business, or . . . the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age."s1 The Court
upheld the preemption of the Wyoming statute by the ADEA. Although game wardens do perform traditional state functions, the
Court concluded that the ADEA did "not 'directly impair' the
State's ability to 'structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions.' "s2 Thus, the federal statute was
saved by the third prong of the Hodel test.
The Court in Wyoming found three reasons why "the degree
49. The Supreme Court has much more readily recognized the existence of a constitutional right where that right can be defined in a clear manner that channels subsequent
judicial inquiry. Compare, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), in which the Court
adopted the rather mechanical one-person, one-vote approach to remedy vote dilution arising out of population inequality among districts, with Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980),
in which the Court declined Justice Marshall's invitation, in dissent, to undertake the difficult task of determining how much disproportionate impact upon the voting strength of the
minority community was enough to invalidate a multimember districting scheme. See
Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91
YALE L.J. 635, 665-73 (1982).
50. 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983). FERC v. Mississippi was decided between Long Island
Rail Road and EEOC v. Wyoming, but the Court in that case eschewed reliance upon the
Hodel test. See supra note 41.
51. 29 U .S.C. 623 (f)(!).
52. 103 S. Ct. at 1062.
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of federal intrusion in this case is sufficiently less serious than it
was in National League of Cities." First, while the FLSA imposed
fiat requirements concerning wages and overtime pay, the ADEA
required only that the state retirement-age policy be tested
"against a reasonable federal standard," with several escape values. Second, the ADEA would have a smaller financial effect
upon the states. Third, the Court in National League of Cities was
concerned that the FLSA could interfere with state policies "beyond immediate managerial goals," such as "offering jobs at below the minimum wage to persons who do not possess 'minimum
employment requirements.'" In contrast, Wyoming made no
claim that its retirement-age statute promoted any such broader
goals, and the Court could not imagine any such goal that would
involve "either the breadth or the importance of the state policies
identified in National League of Cities.''53
All of this may show that the financial effect of the ADEA on
the states will not be drastic. But Hodel does not require a drastic
effect, only a "direct impairment." Given the difficulty of using
the ADEA's escape values,54 the states may be left with the burden of routinely making individualized assessments of the performance of workers between the ages of forty and seventy.
Surely this burden, as applied to workers carrying out traditional
governmental functions, "directly impairs" the states' ability to
structure their employment relationships within the intent of National League of Cities and the meaning of the third prong of the
Hodel test. The only counterargument is that the "majority" opinion in National League of Cities is so opaque that it is impossible
to conclude conclusively that Wyoming is inconsistent with it.55
The cases applying National League of Cities aptly illustrate
the need for judicial candor and courage to overrule precedent
where advisable. Less forthright judicial methods are illegitimate,
as Robert Keeton has explained in language applicable to the
progeny of National League of Cities:
Courts refusing to overrule precedents outright are virtually forced to accomplish
reform by devising a labyrinth of rules with dubious and unpredictable implications. Thus overpowering demands of justice encourage such courts to make casuistic distinctions that produce doubt rather than certainty, irregularity rather
then evenhandedness, and vacillation rather than constancy. Rigorous judicial
abstention from overruling precedents defeats the very stability that those who
53.
54.
55.

Jd at 1062-64.
See id at 1071-72 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).

For a more complete analysis and critique of Wyoming, see Alfange, supra note

17, at 258-80.
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embrace it are trying to preserve. 56

c
The last desperate argument for any legal rule is that, despite
its manifest idiocy, the rule must be maintained to protect innocent individuals who have relied on it. In the context of the pending San Antonio cases, the question of reliance first requires an
analysis of the effect of National League of Cities upon the FLSA.
That decision held the FLSA to be unconstitutional only as applied to employees performing "traditional state functions." Because of the vagueness of this approach, and because the cases
following National League of Cities have not followed it faithfully,
a state could be said to have reasonably relied upon that precedent
only with respect to employees who clearly fell within the sweep
of National League of Cities-police, fire fighters, and the like.s7
In this light, the San Antonio cases do not pose a difficult question
of reliance. The transportation workers in those cases do not fall
within any category specifically identified in National League of
Cities. Moreover, when Long Island Rail Road is considered, the
claim that they perform traditional state functions is made even
more questionable because the transit system in San Antonio had
been operated by a private company until it was purchased by the
municipality in 1959.ss
Thus, if National League of Cities is overruled in the context
of the San Antonio cases, the Court need not address whether N ationa/ League of Cities should be fully retroactively overruled and
the FLSA should apply even with respect to state employees engaged in traditional state functions. Since the statute of limitations for nonwillful violations of the FLSA is only two years,s 9
this question of retroactivity would be mooted rather quickly.
56. R. KEETON, VENTURING To Do JUSTICE 15 (1969).
57. National League of Cities mentions "fire prevention, police protection, sanitation,
public health, and parks and recreation" as prototypic traditional state functions. 426 U.S.
at 851.
58. See San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. at 448
n.4. The conclusion in the text seems correct to me even though the district coun in the
San Antonio cases held that National League of Cities barred application of the FLSA to
these workers. The district coun's holding concerning the applicability of National League
of Cities to transponation workers is inconsistent with Alewine v. City Council, 699 F.2d
1060 (lith Cir. 1983); Dove v. Chattanooga Area Regional Transit Authority, 701 F.2d 50
(6th Cir. 1983); Kramer v. New Castle Area Transit Authority, 677 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 786 (1983); Francis v. City of Tallahassee, 424 So.2d 61 (Fla. App.
1982). The Supreme Coun has not hesitated to apply a decision retroactively to a losing
pany when that pany had relied upon an interpretation of prior law that was not settled.
See infra note 62.
59. 29 U.S.C. § 255.
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This being so, it might well behoove the Court to leave this issue
to the lower courts.
Regardless of which courts end up deciding the issue of retroactivity, it seems clear that there are two alternatives: either all
employees, or all employees except those clearly performing traditional state functions, should be covered by the FLSA retroactively. National League of Cities plainly did not wipe the FLSA
off the books even with respect to employees performing traditional state functions. Although it was once thought that a statute
held to be unconstitutional was a nullity for all past or future purposes, it is now recognized that such a holding simply creates a
defense to enforcement of the statute, does not automatically void
it retroactively,60 and does not prevent its prospective revival.6I
The more difficult question is whether a statute first held unconstitutional and later revivified may have any retroactive impact. To
my knowledge, the Supreme Court has never addressed this issue.
In an analogous area of statutory construction, the Court has
overruled prior constructions of the federal tax laws retroactively
despite the reliance interests of the taxpayers involved, but recently it has indicated a willingness to apply such rulings prospectively in cases involving justifiable reliance by taxpayers. 62 In any
60. Compare Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank. 308 U.S. 371, 374
(1940), with Nonon v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425,442 (1886). A recent example of the
modern approach is the second decision in Lemon v. Kunzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973), in
which the Coun affirmed the holding of a lower coun that allowed Pennsylvania, pursuant
to state statute, to reimburse nonpublic sectarian schools for secular educational services
performed prior to the invalidation of that statute in Lemon I, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Chief
Justice Burger's plurality opinion in Lemon 11 stated that "the remote possibility of constitutional harm from allowing the state to keep its bargain" was outweighed by the fact that
the schools had reasonably incurred expenses in reliance upon the state statute. 411 U.S. at
203-09. Even more recently, in Nonhero Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), the Coun refused to give retroactive effect to its holding that the
Bankruptcy Act of 1978 unconstitutionally conferred Anicle III authority upon judges who
lacked life tenure and protection against salary diminution.
For a venerable consideration of such issues, see generally 0. FIELD, THE EFFECT OF
AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE (1935).
61. SeeJawish v. Morlet, 86 A.2d 96 (D.C. 1952); 39 Op. Atty. Gen. 22 (1937); Cappelletti, Judicial Review in Comparative Prospective, 58 CALIF. L. REv. 1017, 1042 n.98
(1970); Nimmer, A Proposal for Judicial Validation o/ a Previously Unconstitutional Law:
The Civil Rights Act of 1875, 65 CoLUM. L. REV. 1394 (1965).
62. Decisions such as Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940), which overruled a
Supreme Coun decision's interpretation of a federal revenue act, and Helvering v.
Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938), which overruled longstanding Supreme Coun precedent
holding that wages of state employees were constitutionally immune from federal taxation,
were applied retroactively despite the harshness of those results. See Note, Prospective
Operation o/ Decisions Holding Statutes Unconstitutional or Overruling Prior Decisions, 60
HARV. L. REv. 437 (1947). More recent cases have indicated a willingness to consider
prospective application of an interpretation of the federal tax laws that conflicts with a
theretofore settled understanding of those laws. See Diedrich v. Commissioner, 457 U.S.
191, 200 n.IO (1982); United States v. Estate v. Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286, 294-95 (1970).
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event, the states should prevail when their reliance interests are
balanced against the federal interest in full enforcement of the
FLSA and the interests of the affected employees in receiving the
protections of the act retroactively. The states should not be subjected to retroactive monetary liability simply because they took
the Court seriously in structuring their relations with their employees. Avoiding this hardship upon the states should make it
easier for the Court to overrule National League of Cities.
III
Although National League of Cities is ripe for an artful overruling, two potentially thorny problems of symbolism might seem
to suggest that the Court should stay its hand. The first is the
recent vintage of National League of Cities. At this writing that
precedent is only eight years old. Overruling such a recent precedent might make the Court appear particularly arbitrary. One obvious response-that National League of Cities had itself
overruled an eight-year-old precedent-is inadequate, if for no
other reason than that two wrongs don't make a right. Second,
National League of Cities was a five-to-four decision, and its overruling could be accomplished by the change of one vote. Justice
Blackmun is, of course, the likely candidate considering both his
hesitant concurrence in National League of Cities and his membership in the Wyoming majority. It might appear that stare decisis
should have a firmer foundation than the vacillations of one
justice.
These two considerations are obviously related. The usual
concern about overruling a recent precedent is that it may have
fallen victim simply to a change in personnel rather than reasoned
reconsideration.63 This concern is not applicable to National
League of Cities, since Justice O'Connor-the only justice appointed after N ationa/ League of Citie9-agrees with her predecessor, Justice Stewart, that it was correctly decided.64 Thus the
63. Israel cited sources showing that "[a)pproximately three-quarters of all overruling
cases have reversed cases decided within the previous twenty-five years . . . and have occurred within a five-year period after significant changes (3 to 6 Justices) in the Court's
composition." Israel, supra note 22, at 218 n.31 (citing Bernhardt, Supreme Court Reversals
on Conslilutionallssues, 34 CoRNELL L.Q. 55 (1948); and Ulmer, An Empirical Analysis of
Selected Aspects ofLawmaking ofthe United Stales Supreme Court, 8 J. PuB. L. 414 (1959)).
These conclusions are dated, but an examination of overruling cases since these studies
were completed would, I suspect, show that these statistics are still close to the marl'- One
obvious example is Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976), overruling Amalgamated Food
Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968), which had already been
eviscerated in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
64. Justice O'Connor's opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
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situation under consideration is one in which-to return to the
metaphor developed at the outset of this essay-the present Court
is engaging in a soliloquy concerning the viability of one of its
own decisions rather than in a dialogue about a decision of an
earlier Court. Such a soliliquy might reveal a Court vacillating
Hamlet-like before a sea of troubles, perhaps a Court without intellectual leadership or vision. But such an overruling opinion
would be the fruit of principled decisionmaking and constructive
self-doubt as well. The opinion might be a slightly embarrassing
admission of human fallibility, but it would not be raw judicial
fiat.
When justices have become convinced that they themselves
made a recent mistake, they have sometimes decided to overrule
the prior case to avoid the problem of "the unsatisfactory ruling
... becom[ing] more firmly riveted . . . with each repetition"
without overruling.6s The Court recently did just that in United
States v. Scott,66 a double jeopardy case in which Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court overruled a decision only three years
old that he had written for the Court.67 The Court in Scott stated
that "our vastly increased exposure to the various facets of the
Double Jeopardy Clause has now convinced us that [the earlier
decision] was wrongly decided."6s This "vastly increased exposure" was the result of several intervening decisions.69 These "lessons of experience," the Court stated, quoting Justice Brandeis's
classic analysis of stare decisis, 10 were sufficient to support the
overruling of the recent precedent. 11 In light of Long Island Rail
pan in FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 775-97, and her joining in the dissenting opinions
of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell in Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1068-75, 1075-81,
demonstrate that she is an avid believer in National League of Cities.
65. Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 3, 14 (1966).
66. 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
67. United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975). All five members of the majority of
the Coun in Sco/1 had been in the majority in Jenkins.
68. 437 U.S. at 86-87.
69. The Coun in Sco/1 wrote that "our growing experience with Government appeals
convinces us that we must re-examine the rationale of Jenkins in light of Lee [v. United
States, 432 U.S. 23 (1977)], Martin Linen [United States v. Manin Linen Supply Co., 430
U.S. 564 (1977)], and other recent expositions of the Double Jeopardy Clause." 437 U.S. at
95.
70. 437 U.S. at 101 (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393,406-08
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). Justice Brandeis's statement is quoted in large pan in
note 19 supra.
71. See also Oregon ex rel State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429
U.S. 363 (1977), in which a six-member majority overruled Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona,
414 U.S. 313 (1973), a 7-1 decision, and the famous tlag salute case, West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), in which a six-member majority overruled Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), which had a seven-member majority with one justice concurring in the result and one justice dissenting.
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Road and Wyoming, essentially the same could be said of National
League of Cities.
But even if recent precedents are not sacrosanct, that does not
mean that one justice's vote should be allowed to eviscerate them.
Here, again, it is necessary to note that Justice Blackmun, the focus of this inquiry, was a member of the Court that decided National League of Cities. At the outset, he reduced its precedential
value by only haltingly joining that opinion. His vote to overrule
National League of Cities would seem to be a change of heart
based on thoughtful reconsideration. It would not be subject to
the criticism, as would be such a vote by a new appointee, that it
was simply the reflection of personal judicial politics. That the
soliloquy of stare decisis is reduced in this case to one justice talking to himself does not render the process illegitimate. Indeed,
considering the obvious personal and institutional incentives
against changing a vote in these circumstances, the mere fact that
a justice has changed his vote implies that he felt compelled to do
so by principle, not personal politics.
Such a change of vote by Justice Blackmun would not be unprecedented. The most famous incident in which a judicial
change of vote resulted in the overruling of recent precedent is
undoubtedly "the switch in time that saved nine," Justice Roberts's decision in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish to abandon the con. servative bloc and join four others to uphold a state minimumwage law. A more recent example is Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Union,n a five-to-two decision that overruled an eightyear-old precedent, Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 7 3 itself a fiveto-three decision, on an issue of statutory construction, where
stare decisis supposedly has greater force.74 Justice Stewart, who
had joined Sinclair, provided the fifth vote for the decision in Boys
Markets. He wrote a short concurring opinion noting that "[a]n
aphorism of Mr. Justice Frankfurter provides me refuge: 'Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it
merely because it comes late.' "?s
398 U.S. 235 (1970).
73. 370 u.s. 195 (1962).
74. See supra note 19.
75. 398 U.S. at 255 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Henslee v. Union Planters
Bank, 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). See also Perez v. Campbell,
402 U.S. 637 (1971), overruling Kesler v. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962), where
Justice Brennan's change of vote was critical.
In Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. Ill (1965), the Court overruled another aspect
of Kesler, supra, involving three-judge court jurisdiction. Justices Harlan and Brennan
switched to provide the necessary votes in Swift. Justice Harlan's opinion for the Court in
Swift announced respect for stare decisis by stating that "(t]he overruling of a six-to-two
72.
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The possibility that Justice Blackmun's votes will have first
created and then destroyed a major constitutional doctrine obviously raises troubling concerns about the judicial process. The
Legal Realists taught us that judges make law rather than find it.
Today the Critical Legal Scholars tell us that "[j]udges [should]
not delude themselves into thinking that what they do has significance different from, and broader than, what every other political
actor does."76 Occasionally, even a justice has recognized the potential force of such a criticism, as "when an important shift in
constitutional doctrine is announced after a reconstruction in the
membership of the Court."77 If the Court is only a political institution, the art of overruling is merely a cosmetic craft for law
clerks, who must put the best face they can on the judges' capricious decisions.
This is not the place for a full-blown essay on the "dilemmas
of liberal constitutionalism," to borrow Mark Tushnet's phraseJs
My tentative view is that the problems of the arbitrariness of values and the gap between the Supreme Court's impersonal image
and its subjective reality ought to be forthrightly recognized. At
the same time the institutional factors that might constrain judicial decision making must be examined without cynicism.79 The
reconsideration of National League of Cities sheds some light on
these issues. In this small corner of constitutional law, at least, the
sprawl and muddle of hopeless subjectivity are absent. The factors involved in the art of overruling do provide some guidance.
Overruling National League of Cities would make clear that doctrine can be important. Indeed, the fact that the probable catalyst
decision of such recent vintage, which was concurred in by two members of the majority in
the present case, and the opinion in suppon of which was written by an acknowledged
ex pen in the field of federal jurisdiction (Justice Frankfurter], demands full explication of
our reasons." ld at 116. Justice Douglas in dissent said: "My objection is not that the
Coun has not given Kesler 'a more respectful burial,' Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
349 [Harlan, J., concurring], but that the Coun has engaged in unwarranted infanticide."
Id at 133 (dissenting opinion).
76. Tushnet, supra note 34, at 425-26.
77. Graves v. New York ex rei. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 487 (1939) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). In addition, see Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 636 (1974) (Stewan, J., dissenting) ("A basic change in the law upon a ground no firmer than a change in
our membership invites the popular misconception that this institution is little different
from the two political branches of the Government."); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339
U.S. 56, 86 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("Especially ought the Coun not reenforce
needlessly the instabilities of our day by giving fair ground for the belief that Law is the
expression of chance--for instance, of unexpected changes in the Coun's composition and
the contingencies in the choice of successors.")
78. See Tushnet, supra note 34.
79.. A recent essay by Cass Sunstein seems to me to be a step in the right direction.
Sunstem, Politics and Adjudication, 94 ETHICS 126 (1983).
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of such an overruling is Justice Blackmun bolsters the conclusion
that doctrine can dominate constitutional decision making. For
whatever else might be said about Justice Blackmun,so it is clear
that he cares deeply about doctrine and agonizes over doing the
"right"-i.e., institutionally legitimate-thing.
The reconsideration of National League of Cities suggests that
the relevant question is not whether doctrine and precedent matter, but rather how much they matter. This observation is by no
means new, of course. For example, Frederick Schauer recently
noted that the performance of the Burger Court suggests that
"doctrine, precedent, and related institutional considerations have
exerted a considerable restraining influence on what might otherwise have been the more extreme political predilections of the
Court's personnel."s' The fact that National League of Cities does
not fit this description is not cause for despair or cynicism so much
as cause for hope that it will be overruled.
IV
Far from being a threat to the image of principled decision
making, overruling National League of Cities would be an important step toward maintaining the substance of the rule of law. If
the alternatives before the Court in the San Antonio cases are
either to overrule National League of Cities or to continue to pay
lip service to that precedent while minimizing its impact by drawing dubious distinctions between it and later cases, then plainly
the Court should opt for the former. Even though a fair reading
of the cases following National League of Cities shows that they
have hardly riveted armor around that precedent, a new opinion
could give them a revisionist reading stressing their purported adherence to National League of Cities. Without an express overruling, "the threat will always be present that the National League of
Cities doctrine will be revived"s2 with full vigor in some future
case.
In Continental T.V., Inc., v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., the Court justified overruling a ten-year-old precedent because it had been "an
abrupt and largely unexplained departure" from recent precedent
80. He would make an interesting subject for a biography. The limited descriptions
of him to date range from the character assassination of The Brethren to not-so-subtle efforts to reinforce his exercises of judicial activism, see, e.g., Note, The Changing Social
Vision ofJustice B/ackmun, 96 HARV. L. REv. 717 (1983), and they seem to me to be far off
the mark.
81. Schauer, Book Review, 82 MICH. L. REV. 655, 656 (1984) (reviewing THE BURGER CoURT: THE CoUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (V. Blasi ed. 1983)).
82. Alfange, supra note 17, at 281.
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and "the subject of continuing controversy and confusion, both in
the scholarly journals and in the federal courts," and because
"[t]he great weight of scholarly opinion has been critical of the
decision, and a number of the federal courts confronted with
analogous [facts] have sought to limit its reach."s3 In a similar
vein, Justice Rehnquist once urged the overruling of a nine-yearold precedent because it was decided " 'by a closely divided court,
unsupported by the confirmation of time,' and, as a result of its
weak precedential and doctrinal foundation, it cannot be viewed
as a check on 'the living process of striking a wise balance between
liberty and order as new cases come here for adjudication.' "s4
These quotations are as good a place as any for the Court to begin
its decision of the pending San Antonio cases.
In considering whether to overrule National League of Cities,
the Court might do well to recall the oral argument in that case.
Solicitor General Bork presented a strong defense of the FLSA
amendments. In response to questioning, however, he conceded
that federal regulation of salaries of certain state policy-making
officials (who were not covered by these amendments) might be
beyond Congress's authority under the commerce clause. When
Bork stated in response to another question that federal regulation
of the salaries of state judges might be subject to the same objection, a remarkable colloquy ensued between Bork and Justice
Rehnquist:
Q: But judges (do] not make policy generally.
MR. BORK: There is a school of thought centered in the Yale Law School,
Mr. Justice Rehnquist, that suggest[s] that they do occasionally. But I was trying
to prevent it in this case. [Laughter].
Q: Touche.85

Bork's effort to limit judicial policy making ended in failure,
of course, as Justice Rehnquist had what appeared to be the last
laugh. But stare decisis, properly understood, in no way immunizes N ationa/ League of Cities from overruling. The San Antonio
cases provide the Court with the opportunity to render National
League of Cities a mere detour from the path of constitutional
principle.

83. 433 u.s. 36, 47-48 (1977).
84. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 32 (1980) (dissenting opinion), arguing for the
overruling of Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
85. Transcript of Reargument at 63, National League of Cities (Mar. 2, 1976).

